

Witness Name: Roger Evans  
Statement No.: WITN3859005  
Exhibits: None  
Dated: 17 August 2021

## **INFECTED BLOOD INQUIRY**

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### **FIFTH WRITTEN STATEMENT OF ROGER EVANS IN RESPONSE TO CRITICISM BY W1800**

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I provide this statement in response to the notification under Rule 13 of the Inquiry Rules 2006 dated 21 June 2021 and the request under Rule 9 of the Inquiry Rules 2006 dated 24 June 2021.

I, Roger Evans, will say as follows: -

#### **Section 1: Introduction**

1. Please see my first statement, dated 10 November 2019, which sets out my personal information and background.

#### **Section 2: Responses to criticism by W1800 at paragraphs 6-18 of his statement (WITN1800003) dated 6 May 2021**

2. The incident which W1800 is addressing in his evidence of 11<sup>th</sup> June 2021 took place on 17<sup>th</sup> April 2013. A group of about six Caxton Foundation (CF) and Macfarlane Trust (MfT) beneficiaries, mainly men, entered the Alliance House offices (AHO) unauthorised and without permission. This was extremely upsetting to the staff and, as I explain below, posed possible safeguarding and security risks. W1800 was the only MfT beneficiary. W1800 says in his statement they came to the office to deliver a document. If this were so they could have left it with the Office Manager at the door. I cannot recall the document that was delivered.

3. I was not in the office at the time of this incident. I met with the staff a day or two afterwards, to obtain the facts and to reassure them. I trusted what I was told by staff, as they were still rattled and upset when I spoke with them.
4. The AHO offices were on the first floor of Alliance House. The building was used for office purposes by a number of organisations. In order to enter the office, it would have been necessary to walk past a communal reception area (which was often unstaffed) and, when reaching the first floor, to ring a bell at the door of the secure office. The door was always securely locked with a code. I was told that the AHO Office manager went to the door on hearing the bell, to see who was there. I was told that when the AHO Office manager opened the door, they barged past her and walked along a corridor of approximately 10 metres, and entered the communal office. This was a small working space which, at a push, held up to eight workplaces and housed beneficiaries' personal files in filing cabinets. Most staff were in the office at the time (but not the CEO) and the beneficiaries appeared suddenly. Their identities were largely unrecognised by the staff. At the time, in the eyes of the staff, the group of men were perceived as posing a physical risk to some of the staff although, as W1800 states, fortunately this did not happen. The staff were very clear that they must not allow unauthorised personnel to access to the offices. During the 10 years I was involved, the office staff followed this to the letter. I cannot recall any other breaches.
5. Subsequently, the beneficiaries posted a message on social media describing their actions in a positive light. My recollection is that this was not received well by many other beneficiaries. W1800 implies this at paragraph 10 of his statement.
6. As well as the issue of the personal safety of staff, the unauthorised entry posed a risk to the privacy and security of information for all beneficiaries. The office contained files for every beneficiary since the inception of MFT. At a guess, that would be the confidential information relating to about 2,000 people. Each one of the beneficiaries had a personal file, still in paper form, retained in filing cabinets. It would not have been difficult for a group of men to access some of the files.
7. Entry to the communal office was closely controlled. I, for instance, as Chairman, was only allowed to enter when meeting the CEO, and, even then, only with advance notice. I could not just pop in at any time. Similar strictures applied to other trustees. This was due to the confidentiality of the documents held in the office.

8. This security and safety of their personal information and data was much appreciated by the MFT community. It gave them reassurance as to the handling of their very sensitive personal information.
9. W1800's statement appends an undated communication from the previous CEO which includes reference to visiting the office. When beneficiaries came in to see the CEO, they were seen in a room in the basement, away from the AHO office on the first floor (where the sensitive personal documents were held). Such visiting beneficiaries were not allowed into the working area, for the reasons I have explained above.
10. I did not regard this as a trivial incident. I regarded it as a serious breach of the security putting at risk the highly sensitive personal documents we held in the office. After receiving my letter, sent to him on 1 May, 2013, W1800 did not respond to my suggestion to apologise to the staff at Alliance House.
11. The decision to write to W1800 was made by the CEO and myself. It was supported by the full Board, which included three user trustees. The reason the CEO and I posted the letter on the website was to deter any other beneficiaries who may have felt encouraged to repeat the incident. It was not to target W1800, as he suggests at para 12 of his evidence. As stated in my paragraph 2 above, he was the only MFT beneficiary who entered the building. I had no responsibilities for CF at that time.
12. I do not recall the telephone call from W1800, which he refers to at paragraph 9 of his statement. In fact, I do not think we did speak. He would not have had access to my contact details. My personal telephone numbers were held by the CEO. Those numbers were not passed on to others without my approval. I do not recall the CEO ever passing on my personal telephone number to beneficiaries, except to user trustee Board members. Furthermore, I do not recall receiving any call from W1800 when I was physically present at Alliance House, which was infrequent at that time.
13. I was sorry to learn, now, of W1800's family losses soon afterwards.
14. In summary, I still believe the action I took was appropriate at the time. As Chairman of MFT, I had a responsibility to safeguard staff and ensure they felt safe in their workplace. I also had a responsibility to protect the security of highly sensitive personal information of each MFT beneficiary, and to give beneficiaries confidence that their

personal information was securely held. As I have mentioned in my earlier statement, I was very sensitive to our beneficiaries, and their plight, and carried out my role only to serve them.

**Section 3: Other Issues**

15. I do not wish to raise anything further.

**Statement of Truth**

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true.

Signed: 

<b>GRO-C</b>
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Dated: 17 August 2021