

FIRST WRITTEN STATEMENT OF LORD TREFGARNE
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INFECTED BLOOD INQUIRY

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Section 0: Preface

I, The Rt Hon David Garro, Baron Trefgarne, will say as follows: -

- 0.1. I was born on GRO-C 1941. My address is House of Lords, SW1A 0PW.
- 0.2. I am providing this statement in response to a Rule 9 request from the Inquiry, dated 27 October 2022. The request concerns my role as the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Lords) at the Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) from 6 April 1982 to 13 June 1983.
- 0.3. The matters that I am asked about took place some 40 years ago. I regret that my memory of these events is no longer clear. In drafting my statement, I have necessarily had to rely heavily on the documentary record (which I acknowledge may not be complete). I do wish to record that I am aware that the events which are the subject of this Inquiry are quite appalling. I express my sympathy to all those who have suffered.

Section 1: Introduction

- 1.1. I hold a professional pilot's licence and the various ratings that go with that. I do not have any other professional qualifications. I spent most of my working life outside of politics in the aviation industry.

Career history

- 1.2. The following table provides a brief overview of my career:

1977 – 1979	Opposition Whip, House of Lords
1979 – 1990	Government Minister (details below)
1989	Appointed Privy Councillor
1999	Elected Member of the House of Lords
1994 – 2006	Chairman, Science, Engineering, Manufacturing Technologies Alliance
1999 – 2005	Director, UK Skills
2000 – 2004	Chairman, Association of Conservative Peers
2003 – 2013	Chairman, Libyan British Business Council
2003 – 2006	President, Institute of Electrical Engineers
2015 – 2019	Chairman, Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, House of Lords,
2004 – present	Deputy Chairman, Arab British Chamber of Commerce

- 1.3. I remain an elected hereditary peer in the House of Lords.

Positions in Government

- 1.4. I have held the following Government posts:
- a) 1979 – 1981. Government Whip (a Lord in Waiting), House of Lords.
 - b) 1981. Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Trade.

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- c) 1981 – 1982. Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.
 - d) 6 April 1982 – 13 June 1983. Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, DHSS.
 - e) 14 June 1983 – September 1985. Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Armed Forces.
 - f) September 1985 – 1986. Minister of State for Defence Support.
 - g) 1986 – 1989. Minister of State for Defence Procurement.
 - h) 1989 – 1990. Minister of State, Department of Trade and Industry.
- 1.5. On Tuesday, 6 April 1982, I moved from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to take up my appointment as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the DHSS [WITN7478002]. My predecessor was Lord Elton. In my time in the DHSS, the ministerial structure was as follows:
- a) Secretary of State for Health and Social Security: Norman Fowler MP.
 - b) Minister of State for Health: Kenneth Clarke MP.
 - c) Minister of State for Social Security: Hugh Rossi MP.
 - d) Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health (in the Commons): Geoffrey Finsberg MP.
 - e) Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health (in the Lords): myself, Lord Trefgarne.
 - f) Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Social Security: Tony Newton MP.
- 1.6. The Civil Service side of the Department was headed by the Permanent Secretary; in my time there were two: Sir Kenneth Stowe as Permanent Secretary and Sir Geoffrey Otton as Second Permanent Secretary. The Chief Medical Officer throughout my time was Sir Henry Yellowlees.

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1.7. My Private Office comprised my Private Secretary (an HEO Grade), Christopher Joyce, as well as a Diary Secretary, Paul Kerfoot [WITN7478003].

1.8. I answered for the DHSS in matters before the Lords. This of course included the full range of health and social security issues. I have been shown a selection of the contributions that I made during my period at the DHSS. I am reminded that in this period I also spoke for the Government on a wide range of non-DHSS business, for example I spoke on Bills related to criminal justice, shipbuilders and telecommunications. Lord Lyell, a Lord in Waiting, was assigned to DHSS as Spokesman in the Lords and so on occasion he would have responded rather than me.

1.9. I left the DHSS on Monday, 13 June 1983, following a post-election reshuffle. I recall that the Chief Whip in the Lords told me that I was moving to the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to serve under Michael Heseltine and I went the same day [WITN7478004]. I was succeeded at the DHSS by Lord Glenarthur.

Memberships

1.10. I have neither been a member of nor involved with any committees, associations, parties, societies, groups or organisations relevant to the Inquiry's Terms of Reference.

Private interests

1.11. I neither have nor have had any business or private interests which are relevant to the Inquiry's Terms of Reference.

Other investigations

1.12. I have neither provided evidence to nor have I been involved in any other inquiries, investigations, criminal or civil litigation in relation to the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and/or hepatitis B virus (HBV) and/or hepatitis C

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virus (HCV) infections and/or variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD) in blood and/or blood products.

Section 2: Policy on Blood and Blood Products

- 2.1. The Inquiry asks me (Q6) to explain what responsibility I had while at the DHSS for policy concerning blood transfusion policy and blood products. I have been shown an extract from Lord Fowler's statement to the Inquiry [WITN0771001]. He described me as *"the Minister in charge of blood products"* (paragraph 6.21). Lord Clarke said something similar in his statement to the Inquiry, at paragraph 2.11 [WITN0758001]. I have also been shown an extract from Lord Glenarthur's statement to the Inquiry [WITN5282001]. Lord Glenarthur said, *"My immediate predecessor in the House of Lords was Lord Trefgarne. I do not know whether he held the same portfolio of responsibilities as was given to me; I understand that responsibility for blood products lay with Mr Finsberg."*
- 2.2. With the greatest respect to Lord Fowler and Lord Clarke, I think that they are mistaken. I think that Lord Glenarthur is probably correct about Geoffrey Finsberg's responsibilities. Some forty years have elapsed since I was in the DHSS. I do not now have any clear recollection of my ministerial portfolio. I do not believe that I was ever provided with a document that formalised my duties (either at DHSS, or any other department). I do recall that I had responsibility for mental health and mental handicap. I remember a concern about the special hospitals, which we thought needed attention. I have also been shown a minute that referred to my involvement in a possible amendment to the Human Tissue Act [WITN7478005]. I am sure, however, that I was not the Minister responsible for blood and blood products. Likewise, I do not recall, and the documents do not suggest that I had, any personal responsibility for matters relating to the licensing and importation of blood products (Q8).
- 2.3. The Inquiry has referred me to certain documents. My advisers have identified a small further selection of documents. To assist the Inquiry, in the prose that follows I set out a factual summary of the documents. Where I can, I have added my comments on what the documents show. I emphasise that I have very limited independent recollection of the events about which I am asked and any

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comment that I can give is therefore necessarily reliant on the documentary record.

2.4. I wish to make a further point at the outset. On Monday, 9 May 1983, the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, called a General Election [WITN7478006]. Parliament was dissolved on Friday, 13 May 1983. The General Election took place on Thursday, 9 June 1983.

2.5. I recall that on the day that the election was called Norman Fowler returned from Cabinet to the Department. He told us that the election would take place on 9 June, which meant that he and the other Ministers would have to spend much, if not all, of the intervening four weeks out of the Department campaigning. I was of course not up for election. Norman Fowler explained to me that day-to-day control of the Department would be under me during the pre-election period ("purdah"). I also recall that the Permanent Secretary, Sir Kenneth Stowe, made it very clear to me that I would not and should not make any substantive new policy decisions, although I would not have been restricted from taking decisions that had to be taken urgently on safety grounds. If that had happened, then I would have been very careful to confirm any such decisions with Sir Kenneth Stowe. I also believe that I would have been responsible for signing ministerial correspondence during the purdah period.

2.6. In the prose that follows I draw a distinction between those documents that date from before the General Election was announced and those that date from during the purdah period.

**Documents that pre-date the 1983 General Election
announcement (i.e. prior to 9 May 1983)**

My letter to Merck, Sharpe and Dohme re Hepatitis B vaccine, 4 August 1982

- 2.7. I have been shown internal DH correspondence on the issue of Hepatitis B vaccination. On 27 July 1982, officials minuted Kenneth Clarke's Private Office with a draft reply to a letter from Merck, Sharp and Dohme Ltd and a "line to take" about availability of the vaccine [DHSC0001707]. A subsequent minute, dated 2 August 1982, from another official, Miss Purvis, to Kenneth Clarke's Private Office said,

"Mr Franklin

We spoke. Although Miss Stuart has decided against troubling Lord Trefgarne with the policy question the letter in reply to Mr Angel of MSD needs to go before September. You said you would arrange this and also amendment of the 'lead-in' to the letter for Lord Trefgarne's signature."
[DHSC0001705].

- 2.8. On 4 August 1982, I signed a letter to the Managing Director of Merck, Sharpe and Dohme Ltd, Albert Angel, about the company's new Hepatitis B vaccine [DHSC0001704]. It is plain from Miss Purvis' minute and from the opening line of the letter ("As Kenneth Clarke is out of the office at present I am replying to your letter") that I was asked to sign the letter in Kenneth Clarke's absence. The documents that I have been shown indicate that Kenneth Clarke had ministerial responsibility for Hepatitis B vaccinations. I do not recall this issue and the documents do not suggest I had any personal involvement in this period other than signing the letter to Mr Angel.

My involvement with the Public Health Laboratory Service

- 2.9. On a separate issue, I have been shown the minutes of the Central Blood Laboratory Authority's (CBLA) first meeting held on 3 December 1982 [CBLA0001644]. The minutes referred to a letter dated 30 November from me to the Chairman of Public Health Laboratory Service (PHLS), Dr Gordon Smith,

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about retention of income. There is a similar reference in the minutes of the CBLA's second meeting [DHSC0002223_089]. I am told that my letter to the PHLS cannot now be found.

- 2.10. I have been shown the PHLS' Annual Report for 1982/3. The Report noted that during the year I visited three of the PHLS' sites: their headquarters in Colindale, their laboratory in Guildford and the Centre for Applied Microbiology and Research in Porton Down, Wiltshire. While I do not now recall, I infer that I probably had ministerial responsibility for the PHLS.

John Parker's minute re AIDS, 3 May 1983

- 2.11. The Inquiry refers me to a minute dated 3 May 1983 from an official, John Parker (HS1), to the Private Office (Mrs Walden) of Geoffrey Finsberg [DHSC0001651]. He attached a copy of a "line to take" that had been provided to Margaret Thatcher for PMQs in response to press stories about AIDS together with a briefing note in question and answer form [HSSG0010056_035]. I note that John Parker's minute was copied widely and included the Private Secretaries to Norman Fowler (Mr Godber); Kenneth Clarke (Mr Alcock); and Sir Kenneth Stowe (Mr Doran). It was also copied to the Scottish and Welsh Offices. Notably, it was not copied to my Private Office, so I would not have seen it at the time.
- 2.12. The Inquiry asks (Q12) me whether the fact that the minute was addressed to Geoffrey Finsberg indicated that he was responsible for blood policy. I do not now recall, but I infer from the documents that that was probably the case. For example, in May 1983, Geoffrey Finsberg's Private Office (Mrs Walden) sought a briefing on a Daily Telegraph article relating to AIDS [DHSC0002353_031]. I also note that John Parker's minute invited Geoffrey Finsberg to meet with the Haemophilia Society, which would have been consistent with him being the minister responsible. In the event, the planned meeting between Geoffrey Finsberg and the Haemophilia Society was cancelled due to the election (see the Haemophilia Society's letter of 17 May 1983, [DHSC0003824_170]. I

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understand that Lord Glenarthur picked up the meeting after the General Election, so there must have been a switch in responsibilities at that point [DHSC0002071]. I am not aware that I had any involvement with the Haemophilia Society and the documents do not suggest that I did (Q9 & Q10).

- 2.13. The Inquiry asks whether I should have been informed of the matters contained in John Parker's minute. As the only DHSS Minister in the Lords, it would have been helpful if I had been made aware, in case a question had arisen in the Lords. However, there were many occasions when questions or issues arose without notice and I had to have a rapidly arranged but careful briefing with officials.
- 2.14. These documents represent the totality of the material that I have been shown that pre-dates the 1983 General Election announcement.

Documents that date from the 1983 General Election campaign period

John Parker's minute re Guardian newspaper article on the BPL, 11 May 1983

- 2.15. On 11 May 1983, two days after the election was called, John Parker minuted the Private Office (Mr Godber) of Norman Fowler about a Guardian newspaper article on CBLA funding and the safety of blood products [DHSC0002227_037]. The article (titled "*Fowler's blood money*") was highly critical of the Department. John Parker's view was that the article gave "*a very misleading picture*". He copied his minute to the Private Offices of Kenneth Clarke and Geoffrey Finsberg, as well as to my Private Secretary, Christopher Joyce. I should add here that I would not have been shown everything that was sent to my Private Office; the volume of material made that impossible. If Christopher Joyce judged that there was likely to be a Parliamentary aspect in the Lords, then he

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would make sure that it was passed to me. However, the House of Lords too would have been in recess at the time.

- 2.16. The Inquiry asks me (Q7) what responsibility, if any, I had for decisions relating to the redevelopment and oversight of the Blood Products Laboratory, Elstree (BPL). I have been made aware that Lord Fowler told the Inquiry in his statement that, in my period, Geoffrey Finsberg had day to day responsibility for the BPL redevelopment (paragraph 4.4). I cannot disagree with Lord Fowler; I do not recall any personal responsibility for the BPL.

Dr Galbraith's letter re American Factor VIII, 9 May 1983

- 2.17. On 13 May 1983, Dr Diana Walford minuted Dr Ian Field (both of the DHSS) about a letter dated 9 May 1983 from Dr Galbraith of the PHLS to Dr Field [DHSC0002227_047]. Dr Galbraith's letter concerned reports of people who contracted AIDS through blood products and blood transfusions [CBLA0000043_040]. Dr Galbraith said that all blood products from the USA from donations given after 1978 should be withdrawn from use. Dr Walford's view was that withdrawing American Factor VIII was premature and did not take into account the risks to haemophiliacs of withdrawing a major source of their supplies.
- 2.18. The Inquiry asks me (Q13) whether I saw Dr Galbraith's letter or was made aware of his views. I almost certainly would not have seen his letter and doubt that I was made aware of his views. Lord Fowler indicated in his statement that if officials had needed to raise Dr Galbraith's concerns at Ministerial level, then it would have come to me (paragraph 6.21). I think Lord Fowler is correct in so far as the correspondence dates from the purdah period. But, I have seen nothing in the documents to suggest that I was made aware. The purdah period aside, there would have been no other reason for me specifically to have been made aware of Dr Galbraith's concerns, given this was not (so far as I believe) my area of ministerial responsibility.

My letter to Nicholas Baker MP and “no conclusive proof”, 31 May 1983

- 2.19. The Inquiry refers me to a letter to Nicholas Baker MP that I signed on 31 May 1983 [HSOC0003451]. My letter opened with thanks for Nicholas Baker's letter of 9 May to Kenneth Clarke (which I am told cannot now be found). I wrote of my appreciation of the anxiety among people with haemophilia about press reports on AIDS and stated that I *"would first of all like to put matters into perspective: the cause of AIDS is as yet unknown and there is no conclusive proof that the disease has been transmitted by American blood products."* I am asked (Q14) why I sent the response and whether it was connected to the General Election campaign. Given what I have already said about my role during the purdah period, I am reasonably confident that I was asked to sign this letter because I was the only Minister available in the Department. Norman Fowler, Kenneth Clarke and Geoffrey Finsberg would have been out campaigning.
- 2.20. The Inquiry asks what role I had in drafting the response to Nicholas Baker. The drafting work would have been done by officials; I have not seen any documents that relate to the production of the draft. The letter would most likely have been placed in my despatch box for signature, along with many other letters. I would have opened the box in the evening, read the letters and signed them before my box was collected at 7am the following morning. During the purdah period I would have assumed that any letters put before me for signature would have been drafted by officials based on well-established policy. As I explained above, it was not my role to make any new policy decisions when covering other Ministers' responsibilities during the pre-election period.
- 2.21. The Inquiry asks me about the phrase *"no conclusive proof"* and whether I know how it came to be included in the letter to Nicholas Baker. In the course of preparing this statement the first reference to this phrase that I have seen in the papers was the briefing note attached to John Parker's minute of 3 May 1983 to Geoffrey Finsberg's Private Office (referred to at paragraph 2.11 above)

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[HSSG0010056_035]. The briefing note said, *"As yet there is no conclusive proof that AIDS is transmitted by blood as well as by homosexual contact but the evidence is suggestive that this is likely to be the case."*

- 2.22. The Inquiry also asks why my letter to Nicholas Baker did not contain the caveat that *"the evidence is suggestive"*. I accept the caveat in John Parker's minute has been omitted from the letter I signed but, as I have explained, I was not involved with the draft so cannot explain the reason for the omission. I am asked whether I had any concerns, then or afterwards, about the use of the phrase *"no conclusive proof"* without any caveat. I did not know about the caveat then (John Parker's minute of 3 May 1983 was not copied to me) so I could not have had any concerns at the time and nor was the matter raised with me subsequently.

Draft letter to Clive Jenkins re Hepatitis B vaccine, 31 May 1983

- 2.23. I have been shown a draft letter dated 31 May 1983 sent from Dr Harris (a Deputy CMO) to my Private Secretary **[WITN7478007]**. It was headed *"Draft letter for Lord Trefgarne to send to – Mr Clive Jenkins"*, the General Secretary of the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs union, and was intended as a response to Clive Jenkins' letter of 12 May about the Hepatitis B vaccine. Clive Jenkins' letter of 12 May 1983 had been addressed to Norman Fowler **[DHSC0001657]**. His Private Office had passed it to Dr Harris for advice. I assume that it was intended, as was the case with other letters during the purdah period, that I would sign the response in lieu of Norman Fowler. I am told that a signed copy of the letter cannot be found.

My letter to Sir Brandon Rhys-Williams MP re Hepatitis B vaccine, 9 June 1983

- 2.24. In a similar vein, on 8 June 1983, I signed a letter to Sir Brandon Rhys-Williams MP **[MACK0002663_067]**. The letter that I signed made clear that it was in response to Sir Brandon's letter of 12 May 1983 to Norman Fowler. Sir

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Brandon's letter to Norman Fowler had enclosed a letter dated 27 April 1983 from a constituent who was concerned about availability of the Hepatitis B vaccine [WITN7478008]. I would have been asked to sign the response in Norman Fowler's absence.

- 2.25. These documents represent the totality of the material that I have been shown that dates from the 1983 General Election campaign period.

Letter from Lord Glenarthur to Clive Jenkins re AIDS, 26 August 1983

- 2.26. The Inquiry refers me to a letter dated 26 August 1983 from my successor, Lord Glenarthur, to Clive Jenkins [DHSC0002231_036]. Lord Glenarthur's letter said that it was sent in reply to Clive Jenkins' letter to me of 7 July about AIDS. Lord Glenarthur's letter repeated the line that, *"there is no conclusive evidence that AIDS is transmitted through blood products."*
- 2.27. The Inquiry asks (Q15) why Mr Jenkins sent the letter to me, rather than another member of the ministerial team. The Inquiry postulates that the letter was misdated and was in fact sent on 7 June, during the General Election campaign. I cannot recall this letter and cannot help with whether it was misdated or why it was sent to me. While I do not wish to speculate, it is equally possible that it was correctly dated and was sent to me because I had corresponded previously with Clive Jenkins on the Hepatitis B vaccine (see paragraph 2.23 above).. If that was the case, then I would have left the Department by then so would not have seen it.

Section 3: Knowledge of Risk of Infection from Blood and Blood Products

- 3.1. The Inquiry asks me a series of questions about my knowledge of the risk of infection. I have answered some of the Inquiry's questions on this issue already, in Section 2 above.

Knowledge of risk of transmission of AIDS via blood or blood products

- 3.2. I am asked (Q11) to describe when it was first suggested to me, in my role as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the DHSS, that blood or blood products used in the United Kingdom may risk transmission of AIDS. I am also asked (Q16) to describe how my knowledge of the risk of transmission of AIDS by way of blood products evolved over my time as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State. I do not now have any independent recollection of what I knew when about the risk of transmission of AIDS by blood products.
- 3.3. As to briefings from officials on entry into the Department, I did not receive any formal briefings on current issues when I arrived in any new ministerial role (including in the DHSS). The process for any new minister was very much one of learning on the job.
- 3.4. As to specific briefings on AIDS once in the Department:
- a) I explained at paragraph 2.11 above that the first briefing on AIDS that is apparent in the papers from my period was John Parker's minute of 3 May 1983 to Geoffrey Finsberg, but I was not sent a copy.
 - b) The first briefing from officials on AIDS that I can trace as having been sent to my office is John Parker's minute of 11 May 1983 about the Guardian newspaper article, referred to at paragraph 2.15 above, but I have no way of knowing if I actually saw it at the time. As I have explained above, this was shortly after the General Election had been called and I suspect this was the reason that I began to be copied in.

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- c) I believe that the lack of any documents showing that I was specifically briefed on issues around the safety of blood products is indicative of the fact that this was not my area of ministerial responsibility.

- 3.5. My first direct involvement in the issue of blood products implicated in the transmission of AIDS appears to have been my letter of 31 May 1983 to Nicholas Baker [HSOC0003451], which I discussed at paragraph 2.19 above onwards. As I have said, I believe I was asked to sign this because it was the 1983 General Election campaign period.

Discussions with other Ministers

- 3.6. I am asked (Q17) by the Inquiry if I recall being involved in any discussions with other Ministers about the risk of AIDS, the link between infections and blood and blood products, or the DHSS' response to the risk. The simple answer is that, I am afraid, I do not recall any such discussions.
- 3.7. For completeness I should add that after I had left the DHSS, when I was Minister of State for Defence Support, I attended two meetings of the Interdepartmental Group on AIDS. These were cross-government meetings chaired by the then Minister of State for Health, Barney Hayhoe. At the first meeting, on 2 December 1985, I asked whether it would be desirable to screen the armed forces for HIV [CABO0000221]. At the second meeting, on 15 April 1986, I commented on the difficulties that a paper on confidentiality of information relating to AIDS would cause because homosexuality was (then) illegal in the armed forces [SHTM0001036].

Knowledge of risk of hepatitis

- 3.8. The Inquiry asks me (Q18) about my understanding, while in office, of the risks of hepatitis from the use of blood or blood products. After some 40 years, I cannot assist with this question. There is nothing in the documents made

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available to me (aside from the correspondence regarding the Hepatitis B vaccine, referred to above) which helps me.

Section 4: Other issues

The role of the CMO

- 4.1. The Inquiry asks (Q19) what my understanding was of the role of the CMO during my tenure as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State. In my time, the post was held by Sir Henry Yellowlees. I recall that he was a highly regarded CMO. My understanding was that the CMO was the chief medical adviser to the Secretary of State and head of the medical civil service divisions within the Department. His advice on medical matters would have been given very significant weight by the Department. Politicians, like me and my ministerial colleagues, did not have special expertise in medical or scientific matters. I cannot envisage that Ministers ever would have gone against his advice.
- 4.2. I recall that after I had left the DHSS and moved to the MOD, I asked Sir Henry Yellowlees to review the medical services available to the armed forces.

Guidance issued by the CMO

- 4.3. The Inquiry asks (Q20) whether, in my view, it was part of the role of the CMO to issue guidance, advice or instruction to clinicians and health bodies as to the risks of infection from blood or blood products; the information to be provided to patients regarding such risks; the circumstances in which patients should or should not receive treatment with blood or blood products; or the approach to be taken to testing patients with haemophilia for HIV. These were not issues that I was called upon to consider at the time nor was I given, as I explained above, information or advice on the risks or any relevant briefing. As a result, it was not something I that would have considered at the time and I do not believe that I can comment now.

Guidance issued by the DHSS to clinicians and health bodies

- 4.4. The Inquiry asks (Q21) what consideration, if any, was given by me or others in the DHSS during my tenure as Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for

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DHSS to issue (either directly or via the Chief Medical Officer) guidance, advice or instruction to clinicians and health bodies about the risks of infection from blood or blood products, the information to be provided to patients regarding such risks or the circumstances in which patients should or should not receive treatment with blood or blood products. I do not recall any personal involvement on my part and I of course cannot speak for others in the DHSS.

Reflective questions

- 4.5. The Inquiry asks (Q22 to Q24) a series of reflective questions about decision making. As I have explained, this was not my area of ministerial responsibility. I did not receive any ministerial briefing on these issues and so I do not think that I can comment on how the government at the time handled matters nor offer any further reflections to the Inquiry.

Other matters

- 4.6. I do not have any other comments to make (Q25).

Statement of Truth

I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true.

Signed.....
Dated.....

GRO-C

14/12/2022