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Dr Dow produced a report that stated the introduction of surrogate screening would have little to no impact on reducing the "already low level of NANBH PTH cases at present reported within the West of Scotland region".

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Dr Forrester reiterated Dr Dow in stating that the cost to benefit ratio of introducing surrogate screening in the West of Scotland means he would recommend against it.

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Dr Cash wrote to Dr Fraser to organise a consensus meeting to discuss NANB surrogate testing methods after Dr Fraser's prospective UK trial was turned down at the NBTS Directors' meeting.

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Dr Cash asked Dr Sandler American Red Cross) to enlighten his team on the current state of surrogate donation testing in the USA

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American Red Cross wrote to Dr Cash in response to his letter to Dr Sandler for an update on surrogate donation testing in the USA. This started after a presentation by Dr Harvey Alter at the 1985 AABB annual meeting. They were also preparing for implementing ALT and anti-HBc testing in blood centers.

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Dr Fraser confirmed to Dr Cash the lack of enthusiasm for a study amongst other regional transfusion directors in England and Wales: only he and Dr Contreras had supported it and the rest of the directors "were not very interested."

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Dr Contreras wrote to Dr Smithies (DHSS) with a proposed study of post transfusion Non-A Non-B hepatitis.

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The Society placed undue reliance on the views of Professor Bloom who was not only chair of UKHCDO but also a principal point of reference when seeking advice.

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By the time of the meeting on 8 October 1983 the realisation had dawned within the Society membership that a crisis was looming.

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No questions were asked of Professor Bloom despite the Cardiff case as the Society was too trusting of his advice and was further deferential to Reverend Tanner.

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The Executive Committee had not been told that there was now an authoritative report on the possibility of sexual transmission, and Professor Bloom knew but downplayed it as a real risk.

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There may have been input from members of the Medical Advisory Panel which was not passed on by the Society's internal Blood Products Sub-Committee, as arguably it should have been.

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At the outset of her appointment as CEO of the Haemophilia Society, Karin Pappenheim was given to understand that the campaign for compensation for people with haemophilia infected with Hepatitis C was a very high priority.

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The Society, to save costs, chose to use a single low-cost freelancer for selected public affairs and campaign functions.

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From the Society's perspective the announcement of the setup of the Skipton Fund came out of the blue.

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The Society did not specifically campaign for a scheme which would provide financial support for certain groups, such as the bereaved or those caring for family members or partners who were infected.

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The Department of Health and Social Security was of the view that hepatitis was a serious disease and unless the intention was to process the plasma separately it would be impossible to prevent contamination of the UK material with imported hepatitis viruses.

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Susan Deacon did not want to sign the pre-prepared letter of rejection for the Haemophilia Society's claims for financial support for its members who had been infected with Hepatitis C, without at least meeting delegates from the Society.

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Simon Taylor conveyed to the Inquiry that the Society principally relied upon the advice given to it by its Medical Advisory Panel, which did not meet in person and advice was relayed verbally.

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David Watters had concerns that the Medical Advisory Panel was not getting the most unbiased information. He had concerns that appointments to the Medical Advisory Panel in the 1980s were nepotistic and the source of information was not unbiased. These concerns led to a review of the panel in the 1990s.

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