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The NIBTS used telemarketing which involved eligible donors being telephoned immediately prior to donor sessions.

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Dr Morris McClelland noted that blood shortages were not unknown in Northern Ireland and there were occasions where supplies needed to be rationed or elective surgery had to be postponed.

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In his witness statement, Dr Morris McClelland stated that the Troubles in Northern Ireland and the closure of factories had an adverse impact on donations. A reduction in the donor age limit was introduced to compensate for this loss.

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Dr Morris McClelland considered that he had a role in persuading colleagues to use less whole blood and more red cell concentrates; that "The most effective route of influence" was the haematologists and laboratory staff in charge of hospital blood banks who in turn influenced the clinicians in each speciality.

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Dr Morris McClelland noted in his statement to the Inquiry that there was an increase in red cell concentrates in Belfast from 20% to 75%.

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Dr Morris McClelland noted that the Belfast Regional Transfusion Centre had the capabilities to increase its production of cryoprecipitate to 20,000 packs per annum if they had been requested. No such request was made.

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According to Dr Morris McClelland's evidence, the closure of factories in Northern Ireland had an adverse impact on donor recruitment.

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According to Dr Morris McClelland, when a confirmed positive donor was found at the Northern Ireland Blood Transfusion Service a lookback process would be followed from the outset. However, such occurrences were rare, so the process was relatively informal and ad-hoc, and no additional funding was sought or obtained.

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Dr Morris McClelland personally managed the donor counselling and lookback process in respect of the first confirmed HIV positive donor.

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Within his written statement to the Inquiry Dr Morris McClelland explained that the experiences of trying to implement or pilot these technologies demonstrated that there were so many practical disadvantages as to preclude their use on a large scale

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Consideration began to be given to obtaining factor concentrate from Edinburgh, as there were capacity issues at BPL, but spare capacity at PFC.

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Within his written statement to the Inquiry Dr Morris McClelland advised that there were capacity issues at BPL.

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The relationship between the DHSSNI and the DHSS was one where: "policies adopted by DHSSNI typically followed those of DoH (London) since NI was under direct rule from London."

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An application by Immuno to vary the product licence in respect of Kryobulin to allow European plasma to be sold in red packs and US plasma to be sold in cheaper blue packs was approved.

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The Central Blood Laboratories Authority Sub-Committee meeting minutes record that "Members agreed it was important for proper evaluation of the Ortho and Abbott 1&2 tests to be carried out before RTCs decided which test they would adopt." The anticipated commencement date remained 1 July 1991.

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90% of the plasma production for Factor 8 concentrate had already been achieved.

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In the minutes of the 163rd regional transfusion directors' meeting, the chairman was recorded as saying that 90% of the plasma production for Factor 8 concentrate had already been achieved.

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People with a bleeding disorder who were treated with UK-sourced pooled factor concentrates or antithrombin between 1980 and 2001 were considered at risk of vCJD and informed by their haemophilia centre.

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Gareth Tudor-Williams

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Update on expert groups

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