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Dr Roger Moore explained in his oral evidence to the Inquiry the DHSS's view at the time was that the adverse effects people with haemophilia had suffered were unavoidable.

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During oral evidence to the Infected Blood Inquiry Dr Moore stated that the Secretary of State thought there should be further consideration of financial support to those individuals infected by HIV through blood. Dr Moore confirmed that no payments were made to these individuals at the time.

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Dr Roger Moore told the Inquiry that the concept of 'clinical freedom' was a "major...tenet" which "put a limitation on what the Department could do with clinicians...across all policy areas, clinical freedom was a mantra.

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Dr Gillon gave evidence to the Inquiry that there was a sharp drop off in blood donor numbers between around 1985 and 1987, which he attributed to the effects of AIDS messaging.

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Dr Jack Gillon told the Inquiry his concern that not all Scottish military donors were voluntary.

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Dr Jack Gillon gave evidence to the Inquiry describing that "the biggest problem by far" of the HIV lookback was missing hospital records or the failure to have a record of where the blood component went: "it made it impossible to trace quite a substantial percentage of the components."

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Dr Jack Gillon said in oral evidence that there was "no logic" in deciding not to conduct Hepatitis C lookback as soon as screening became available. His view was that even if there was no available treatment for Hepatitis C infection, individuals should be advised that they had a potentially serious condition.

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Dr Jack Gillion, in his oral evidence to the Inquiry, noted that there was "virtually nothing" in the way of guidelines about the use of transfusion in the early 1980s.

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Half the donations in the North London Centre came from sessions taking place at factories and other large workplaces.

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Dr Patricia Hewitt gave evidence on the lookback steps undertaken by the North London Blood Transfusion Centre. She stated the Centre "would pursue it until we had an outcome".

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Dr Patricia Hewitt suggested that though records should have been made to show that a transfusion had been given, and identifying numbers of the transfused units recorded, practice about this was often casual, and records were often not retained for the length of time necessary to help show some years later that a transfusion had taken place.

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In Dr Hewitt's oral evidence she referred to a case where a recipient developed vCJD, whose family had said that "If they had known that he had been at risk, his last few months would have been dealt with differently...they would have known what they were dealing with, or what they were likely to be dealing with."

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Dr Patricia Hewitt said in oral evidence that she understood the decision not to undertake a UK-wide lookback exercise as soon as Hepatitis C testing became available in 1991 was a decision made by the Department of Health because no treatment could be offered.

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After Dr Gunson's appointment as national transfusion director, he set up a program to coordinate the stocks of blood and its components in England and Wales on a daily basis, with each RTC faxing daily stock lists to Dr Moore.

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According to Dr Vanessa Martlew's evidence to the Inquiry, the regional transfusion centre in Merseyside played a role in auditing the use of blood in their hospitals.

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Dr Andrzej Rejman said in oral evidence that he could not recall discussion or an internal document within the Department of Health regarding commencing a Hepatitis C lookback when testing became available in the early 1990s.

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Dr Rejman expected the PHLS would soon publish the results of their experience of Chiron testing of presumed non-A non-B Hepatitis samples, and would be making a recommendation for use of this test in this publication in September 1989.

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Dr Rejman looked at the "official GEB file series" list when compiling a discovery list.

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In his oral evidence to the Inquiry, Dr Rejman recognised that the files had been sent to the DRO and thought that perhaps David Burrage had had them recalled.

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Dr Rejman did not know what steps David Burrage took to get the GEB/1 files and provide them to him.

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