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Dr Rejman did not know what steps David Burrage took to get the GEB/1 files and provide them to him.

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During his oral evidence to the Inquiry, Dr Rejman's recollection was unclear as to whether files were recalled from the DRO or not.

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In oral evidence to the Inquiry Dr Rejman stated that he went through the official GEB files and that after photocopying them David Burrage "presumably would have sent the files back to DRO".

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Dr Robert Perry, the director of PFC, commented in oral testimony that the leaflets accompanying Factor 8 and 9 concentrates were primarily targeted at the prescribing doctor "and, in a sense, they had a much closer working knowledge of risks of hepatitis non-A, non-B, hepatitis B and, latterly, HIV than the manufacturer of the products. So none of this information would have been a surprise to a treating doctor."

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Dr Perry recalled that Dr Metters was concerned that all the details had to be correct before the bigger in principle decision could be made on HCV screening.

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Dr Andrzej Rejman stated that the departments in Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland were "smaller than DH by a significant margin, and so the relevant doctors in their departments would have had a much wider role." He argued that because of this, they did somewhat rely upon work done within DH.

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Dr Hilary Pickles did not know the factual basis for the assertion of no negligence.

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It was the preference, but not a formal requirement, that the test be licensed in the US by the FDA before being adopted for use in the UK.

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Civil servants from Northern Ireland were invited to attend some of the committees and working parties which reported to the DHSS. According to Dr Pickles this could sometimes be as a "regretful late thought".

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Dr Andrzej Rejman was a senior medical officer in the Department of Health during this period.

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When asked about the assertion that government had acted efficiently to minimise infections to individuals with haemophilia Dr Rejman confirmed that there had been no formal review to justify this.

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The Welsh Office was significantly smaller than the DHSS, and the medical officers would have had a much wider role than in the DHSS, instead of having someone with specific responsibility for blood and blood products.

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Dr Terence Snape said in oral testimony that at PFL, product labels were generated and overprinted on commercially produced labels "even up to 1982".

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In oral evidence to the Inquiry, Dr Terence Snape apologised for not doing more, sooner.

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Professor Collinge told the Inquiry about the progression of vCJD, stating that about 1 in 5,000 people will develop it during their lifetime.

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Dr Robert Perry, the director of PFC, said in oral testimony that if pool sizes hadn't been increased in the early 1980s, then production in the UK wouldn't have kept up with demand and the only alternative would have been to buy more commercial product "which would have been the worst of all outcomes".

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Professor Aileen Keel, when asked if the commercial concentrates given to the children at Yorkhill were the best available treatment in light of medical knowledge at the time, answered: "I suppose with hindsight the answer is no."

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Professor Aileen Keel told the Inquiry that she knew from her own clinical practice in Glasgow, doing clinics with Professor Lowe, that the practice there was to to inform patients of the result of a test if they were found to be HCV positive.

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In oral evidence, Professor Aileen Keel said that during an investigation into how people with haemophilia were infected with Hepatitis C, what was said by Professor Gordon Lowe in respect of a policy to inform patients that they were being tested and the results, was accepted at face value.

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In oral evidence, Professor Keel stated that the Advisory Committee on the Virological Safety of Blood ("ACVSB") had considered this issue over a number of years, on each occasion agreeing that ALT testing should not be introduced because of the poor specificity of the test.

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