Subscribe to Search results

Concerned with costs, the DHSS advised that there was no money available for either the stop-gap proposals or an upgrade of BPL.

Published on:

In a letter, J Brown advised Mr Williams that the Medicines Inspectorate report had highlighted the severe shortcomings of the standards at BPL and that had the laboratory not had Crown immunity activities would have been suspended immediately.

Published on:

John Harley wrote a memo that noted he had tried to dissuade the Scientific and Technical Committee from initiating planning as no decision had yet been taken to build a new fractionation plant at BPL and there was no budget for even a development plan.

Published on:

Dr Vaughan, then the Minister of State for Health, agreed to there being a short-term upgrade to BPL and further exploration of options for rebuilding within the NHS or in collaboration with industry.

Published on:

Ministers asked to see whether there might be scope for further savings in the stop-gap measures as they were concerned that there might be no justification to incur short-term costs on upgrading if BPL was to be rebuilt.

Published on:

Dr Lane sent a letter to Mr Harley of the DHSS enclosing a paper titled "Reviewed Interim Budget Submission 1980/81, Capital Forecast Expenditure".

Published on:

A meeting was held to discuss expenditure on the upgrading of BPL. It was determined that proposals would be put forward on the basis that only £500,000 was available to spend on short-term developments at BPL.

Published on:

Dr Vaughan finally approved a submission that had been put to him proposing expenditure of £1.3 million over two years.

Published on:

Peter Wormald noted in a memo that the success of the extra expenditure would depend on persuading RHAs to increase plasma supplies.

Published on:

Long-term upgrading was considered at a meeting of the Scientific and Technical Committee.

Published on:

It was reported to the Committee that officials had been instructed by ministers to investigate the possibility of collaborating with private industry. Initial discussions had taken place.

Published on:

Worries were expressed on various aspects of collaboration with private industry, including the fear it would be difficult to prevent the contamination of UK material with imported Hepatitis viruses.

Published on:

In a DHSS press release, Dr Vaughan announced there would be no commercial management of BPL as there was a modernisation programme already underway.

Published on:

Dr Dunhill, a member of the Scientific and Technical Committee, wrote to Dr Vaughan outlining his acceptance of the situation in the short term only from consideration of the need to maintain plasma fraction supply.

Published on:

A minister asked the Policy Steering Group for the development of BPL to give consideration to the use of an existing factory which could be adapted at a relatively low cost to meet requirements.

Published on:

Approval was sought for planning to proceed on the assumption that BPL would process all the plasma for both England and Wales as the PFC did not have additional capacity without introducing three shift patterns.

Published on:

The Treasury approved the redevelopment in principle and agreed that the project should be fast-tracked.

Published on:

In a report, Dr Lane outlined that the final cost of MARP01 would be £2.8 million.

Published on:

Construction of BPL finally began in May 1983. The original completion date was to be July 1985.

Published on:

In a written answer on the NBTS and Factor 8, Kenneth Clarke, the Minister of State for Health, stated that "We decided in 1982 that this country should become self-sufficient in blood products".

Published on: