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The SHHD asked the DHSS when the Protein Fractionation Centre would be provided with English plasma for fractionation.

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During the closing submissions made on behalf of the DHHS and NHSBT to the Inquiry, emphasis was placed on the constrained financial position of the UK during the 1970s.

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During the closing submissions made on behalf of the DHSC to the Inquiry, some reasons for the delay in achieving in self-sufficiency included the withdrawal of the Lister Institute from the running of BPL, the constraints of the site BPL occupied, and the time it took to purchase land from the Lister Institute to enable expansion.

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During the closing submissions made on behalf of the NHSBT to the Inquiry, emphasis was placed on the constrained financial position of the UK during the 1970s.

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In his written evidence to the Inquiry, Lord Norman Fowler noted that the overspend on the BPL project reflected "poorly on the Department".

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The delays and additional expenses incurred in the redevelopment of the BPL were caused by the complexity of the new plant site and build, the various re-designs which took place during the project, poor management from the CBLA, and a lack of close oversight by the DHSS.

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An incoming chief executive of the CBLA was reported to have told officials that on the basis of a lifetime's experience in the pharmaceutical industry the new BPL building represented value for money.

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Ministers invested money into the BPL project at a very considerable level despite the financial pressures on health spending at the time.

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In a memo from Gwen Watson to Strachan Heppell, it was noted that the BPL project had been "badly handled".

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In a memo from Michael O'Connor to Strachan Heppell, it was noted that the BPL project was a "shambles".

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Consideration began to be given to obtaining factor concentrate from Edinburgh, as there were capacity issues at BPL, but spare capacity at PFC.

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Although Northern Ireland was able to make cryoprecipitate from local blood donors, it was too small to produce factor concentrate itself.

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The quantity of NHS factor concentrate used in Northern Ireland increased dramatically once Northern Irish plasma began being sent to the BPL, as Factor 8 concentrate manufactured at Liberton was sent in return.

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Prescribing choices in England and Wales (being the choices that would be reflected in demand) were being formed when imported commercial Factor 8 filled the gap left by BPL's failure to supply, and this continued into the early 1980's.

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The increasing use of plasmapheresis for collection was pursued as it was a safer base material to manufacture concentrates due to the larger donation that was able to be extracted (the amount of plasma from one donation of whole blood was 40% of that from a donor of plasma by plasmapheresis).

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In Scotland, the national blood service defined self-sufficiency in blood products as the production of enough factor concentrate from a country's own resources to meet clinical need without the need for importation.

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At a meeting of the Blood Products Laboratory, it became clear that PFC's construction would cost more than the sum approved, and that despite a planned 1,500-litre capacity, it would initially only operate at 1,000 litres per week to reduce cost.

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It was estimated that 74 million international units of Factor 8 could be produced in the UK once the requirements for albumin were met.

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During this period, government funding was exceptionally constrained, inadequate and difficult to obtain for the redevelopment of BPL and the production of additional plasma for national self-sufficiency.

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Dr Angela Robinson was an enthusiast for plasmapheresis, and set up a pilot unit in Yorkshire.

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