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At Oxford (and in common with most regional transfusion centres), in the period leading up to production of the first AIDS leaflet in September 1983, no particular steps were in place to screen out high-risk AIDS donors.

Published on: 25 July, 2024

Once the AIDS leaflets were available, they were put on display at donor sessions but not sent out with the call-up cards. Dr Colin Entwistle suggested this was "not the most appropriate way, not least because that would not cater for the walk-in donors."

Published on: 25 July, 2024

The Oxford Centre held a stock of 13,000 leaflets, had issued approximately 1,000, and had a "now negligible" rate of usage per month, meaning that donors were not picking up and removing the leaflets from where they were displayed.

Published on: 25 July, 2024

Dr Colin Entwistle, director of the Oxford Blood Transfusion Centre, described an "ad hoc system" in place for carrying out investigations into HIV as this was "not a regular routine activity. On the other hand, obviously, when a positive case turned up, it would be necessary to go back and see what we can find by way of further information about the same donor."

Published on: 26 July, 2024

Lord Patten stated "unequivocally" that ministers should have been informed about Dr Galbraith's letter. He also stated that if he had seen it "I think I probably would have
pressed the panic button."

Published on: 24 September, 2024

Lord Patten stated that ministers were not told of Dr Galbraith's paper, and were not told about the CSM's decision-making, which he found very hard to understand why.

Published on: 24 September, 2024

The response to recipients of blood that had been exposed to AIDS was to try to talk up what the Government was doing. Lord Patten acknowledged, "Defensive Press Briefing" was "not a nice phrase".

Published on: 24 September, 2024

Lord Patten observed the DHSS should be "presenting things truthfully", as opposed to "presenting things well."

Published on: 24 September, 2024

Lord Patten did not understand why it had taken so long or why there was no sense of urgency in producing the leaflet.

Published on: 24 September, 2024

Lord Patten had no recollection of ever meeting Sir Henry Yellowlees. He did however have interactions with Dr Acheson although there was no system of regular meetings with the CMO.

Published on: 24 September, 2024

Lord Patten stated that ministerial submissions would be required for a change of policy or significant new spending commitments. He also acknowledged that a concern about media interest or adverse press comment might lead to a matter being brought to the attention of ministers.

Published on: 24 September, 2024

Dr Galbraith's views were not communicated to ministers, the CMO, or shared with haemophilia centre directors, regional transfusion directors, or with the SHHD, DHSSNI and Welsh Office. Each minister thought ministers should have been told.

Published on: 24 September, 2024

The functions of the Secretaries of State for Health of the UK, as Licensing Authority, under the Medicines Act 1968, were discharged by the Medicines Division of the DHSS.

Published on: 23 July, 2024

The Sub-Committee on Biological Products ("CSM(B)") worked on its own.

Published on: 23 July, 2024

The CSM(B) members would know the views of the Medicines Division staff, for their reports did not simply summarise any danger but expressed a view on it.

Published on: 23 July, 2024

Professor Sir Michael Rawlins did not know why the CSM had not pressed for greater transparency at an earlier stage.

Published on: 23 July, 2024

Professor Sir Michael Rawlins believed side effects of medicine "was a judgment of balancing safety and efficacy."

Published on: 23 July, 2024

Professor Sir Michael Rawlins stated that FDA approval was given if the licensing body had found it was appropriate and therefore it carried weight to the product.

Published on: 23 July, 2024

Professor Sir Michael Rawlins stated in his oral evidence that Dr Galbraith's May 1983 letter and paper should have been provided to the CSM(B).

Published on: 23 July, 2024

Professor Sir Michael Rawlins (CSM) stated in his oral evidence that if they had known AIDs was caused by a virus and how donors were pooled in the US, they would have acted differently regarding the importation of commercial factor concentrates.

Published on: 23 July, 2024

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