Subscribe to Search results

Dr Entwistle stated that RTC directors did not have an input in the setting of targets for plasma production, and targets were set by BPL as it was responsible for finding sufficient raw material to provide the products needed. BPL divided the total required into proportions to be provided by individual RTCs.

Published on:

Initially the Oxford and Wessex RTCs were the only regions exempt from BPL's pro rata system, which meant that the amount of concentrate BPL returned to the RTC was proportionate to the amount of plasma the RTC supplied. However, from June 1981 onwards the pro rata system was applied to the Oxford RTC too.

Published on:

Dr Colin Entwistle provided a phone service so products could be released from Cambridge RTC to hospitals during the night.

Published on:

Oxford RTC's plasma was sent to the PFL in Oxford which sent fractionated products directly to the Oxford Haemophilia Centre.

Published on:

Due to the fact that the donor population differed between areas, some RTCs were able to collect more blood donations than they required.

Published on:

Dr Entwistle had not been aware of the shortage in adjacent areas and later reflected that this underlined the need for a rationalisation of the service.

Published on:

A pro rata system was introduced for the supply of factor concentrate to RTCs, whereby the amount of concentrate provided to each RTC reflected the amount of plasma provided to BPL by that RTC.

Published on:

The armed forces were a source of blood donors. Dr Colin Entwistle described these military sessions as "incredibly beneficial" and did not perceive military donors to impose particular extra risks.

Published on:

Generally, between 100 and 200 donors would be bled at each session. According to Dr Entwistle, at Oxford about 50% of around 200 donors called would attend plus around 10% walk-ins and at a Cambridge military session there may be as many as 240 donors.

Published on:

Each blood donor would be booked in by a member of the clerical staff who should have had a copy of (and/or received training on) the most up-to-date national guidelines produced by the regional transfusion directors, and donors would be given written material on arrival, which set out the eligibility criteria.

Published on:

In his oral evidence, Dr Colin Entwistle accepted that discussions about whether or not the donor might have an infectious disease would in effect be taking place in public in an "open forum".

Published on:

Dr Colin Entwistle was elected to serve on the care and selection of donors working party by the western division of the regional transfusion centres and tasked with producing the guidelines for donor exclusion. According to Dr Entwistle, the guidelines were "a common agreed policy which everyone can agree to" and were not to be seen as a record of best practice.

Published on:

Dr Contreras stated in her oral evidence that the pressure to introduce screening was from the liver disease specialists and the Haemophilia Centre Directors

Published on:

Dr Contreras stated in oral evidence she felt it was taking too long to secure funding for a study into surrogate testing

Published on:

Dr Contreras stated, upon reflection, she had underplayed the risk of NANBH when writing to Dr Barbara in 1987

Published on:

Dr Contreras expressed the view changed for Medicines Control Agency (MCA) from 'maximum benefit at minimal cost' to 'if a measure reduces risk, we should take it' and that she shared this change in view in 1991.

Published on:

The North London Regional Transfusion Centre was not able to fully comply with the Department of Health and Social Security requirement that the second AIDS leaflet be brought to the attention of each donor on an individual basis, as the call-up system using postcards meant that the leaflet could not be sent out at the same time.

Published on:

Professor Dame Marcela Contreras confirmed that she saw from observation of what she described as a miracle for some babies who received fresh war blood, that it might indeed have some intra-operative advantages, though she did not express a concluded view.

Published on:

In her oral evidence to the inquiry, Dame Contreras reflected that there was little good reason for delaying the start of testing - a policy of waiting when it had already been agreed to introduce a test was always going to result in unnecessary infections.

Published on:

In evidence, Dame Contreras told the Inquiry that arranging provision for counselling alongside anti-HCV testing was an issue of cost and manpower.

Published on: