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David Tonkin was not told for 2 years that he had HCV.

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Evidence Based Blood Transfusion Agenda of symposium hosted by UK CMOs was attended by transfusion experts, clinicians, NHS managers and health authority chief executives across the UK.

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At an MSBT meeting it was noted that the lookback had been slower in achieving its objectives than had been predicted and a number of options were considered.

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Following the Haemophilia Society's press launch on AIDS in the haemophilia community, stories appeared in "The Times", "The Daily Telegraph", "The Guardian", "The Independent" and the "Daily Mail".

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Dr Rejman wrote to Ruth McEwen stating that it was "wholly inappropriate and wasteful of resources for any further discovery to be undertaken until we were certain that something would come of the HCV haemophilia case."

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Paul Pudlo (Department of Health) acknowledged that the Secretary of State had consistently opposed any form of no-fault compensation but interpreted his position as being that it was preferable to live with the anomaly of the HIV scheme than to remove it by making it the norm.

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In an internal memo it was stated that only half of the HIV discovery documents had been sourced.

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The Secretary of State gave oral evidence regarding the Select Committee Enquiry on AIDS.

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An AIDS basic fact summary sheet stated that there was great sympathy for the people with haemophilia affected, but it was not until knowledge grew that safe blood products could be made and used.

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Dr Rejman provided a list of the documents to Ruth McEwen that had been disclosed in the HIV litigation.

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In a memo from Lord Hunt to others, he proposed a co-ordinated package of care to those infected with HCV.

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The line that patients received the best treatment available in the light of medical knowledge at the time, reflected the speech drafted by civil servants for Thomas Sackville, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Health, for an adjournment debate in July 1995, as well as the Q&A briefing that he received.

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Heather Rogers requested information to be sent to the Secretary of State with submissions on the financial compensation that would be sent to the Haemophilia Society.

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Dr Winyard stated in a memo to Chris Kelly that it seemed that there were very real dangers in moving from specifics to general policy issues, even more so because the Haemophilia Society was aware of Secretary of State's intention to 'write to No 10'.

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Dr Lane's view was that "the risks of transmission of HIV were such that heat treatment should be employed even if it turned out to be a temporary expedient."

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There were fears that the Factor 9 concentrate in particular - but also Factor 8 - might give rise to a greater risk of thrombosis from the heat-treated product, although research facilities were limited, scientific staff were few, and BPL suffered from a lack of viral containment equipment.

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Dr Richard Lane recorded that no work was done by BPL during 1981 to research heat treatment.

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BPL planned to apply dry heat treatment to all the Factor 8 produced at BPL because it was shown that heat treatment appeared to inactivate the HTLV-3 virus which by then had been identified as the cause of AIDS.

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According to Dr Lane, a "requirement for central funding for research and development was a continuous theme in 1981."

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Dr Lane complained that the "Department of Health policy was that Regional Health Authorities were to all intents and purposes responsible for allocation of budgets, and the Department of Health would not intervene in the exercise of their discretion."

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